How different parts of who we are — race, gender, class, disability, and more — combine in ways that shape experience. Why understanding these combinations matters for justice, and where the concept is helpful and where it is contested.
The full concept of intersectionality is too complex for young children. But the foundation is simple and age-appropriate: every person is more than one thing. A child is at once someone's son or daughter, a student, a friend, a member of a family, from a particular place, with a particular language, with particular likes and abilities. Children understand this intuitively — they know they are not just one thing. The goal at early years is to help them recognise that every person is complex, that we cannot assume someone's experience based on one thing about them, and that listening to people's whole stories matters. Handle naturally. Do not use adult academic language. Focus on the experience of being many things at once and the importance of listening before assuming. No materials are needed.
If you know one thing about a person, you can guess what they are like.
You cannot really know someone from one thing. Two children the same age can be very different. Two people from the same place can have very different lives. Two girls or two boys can like completely different things. One thing about a person — their skin colour, their age, where they are from, whether they have a disability — never tells you their whole story. Good friends and good citizens are curious about people's whole selves. They ask. They listen. They are surprised in good ways by what they learn.
Noticing differences between people means treating them unequally.
Noticing differences is not the same as treating people unequally. In fact, sometimes treating everyone exactly the same is actually unfair. A child who cannot walk easily needs a ramp to join in; giving them 'the same' as other children (no ramp) leaves them out. A child learning a new language may need extra help to understand a lesson; giving them 'the same' lesson in words they cannot yet follow leaves them behind. Fair treatment sometimes means noticing who needs what. Good friends, good teachers, and good neighbours notice people's whole selves — not to treat them as less, but to understand what each person needs to be included and to flourish.
Intersectionality is a concept developed by American legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw in 1989. It describes how different aspects of a person's identity — such as race, gender, class, sexuality, disability, religion, age — combine and interact, rather than operating separately. The term emerged to address a specific legal problem: US courts had ruled that Black women could claim discrimination as women or as Black people, but not as Black women specifically. This meant that forms of discrimination that affected Black women particularly (not white women or Black men in the same way) could go unrecognised. Crenshaw argued this was a failure of the legal system to see how identities intersect.
A Black woman is not simply a Black person plus a woman. Her experience of racism is shaped by being a woman (Black women face specific stereotypes); her experience of sexism is shaped by being Black (different from white women's experiences). The intersection is its own distinctive experience. The same logic applies to other intersections — a disabled working-class man, a gay Muslim woman, a migrant elderly person. Each combination produces a specific experience that cannot be fully understood by looking at each identity separately.
The concept has proven useful in multiple ways. Legally — helping courts recognise forms of discrimination that single-identity frameworks miss. Politically — helping movements include people who have been marginalised within marginalised groups (Black women in women's movements; disabled people in racial justice movements). Analytically — giving researchers tools to understand how factors combine. Personally — helping people make sense of their own experiences.
Since Crenshaw's original 1989 article, intersectionality has become one of the most influential concepts in social science, feminist theory, legal studies, and activism. It has expanded beyond its original US Black feminist roots to applications globally and across many identities. It has also become widely used (and sometimes misused) in popular discourse.
The concept has genuine critics. Some argue it has become too broad to be analytically useful — if everyone has intersecting identities, what distinguishes one case from another? Some argue it encourages identity-based politics over shared class interests. Some argue it is used to claim authority in discussions rather than to advance understanding. Some object specifically to particular applications in politics or institutions. These critiques are not all valid, but they are not all unreasonable either. Serious engagement means understanding both the genuine contribution of the concept and the legitimate critiques.
Intersectionality is a useful but complex concept. At primary level, focus on the core insight that identities combine and interact, with accessible examples. Acknowledge that people hold different views on how far to extend or apply the concept. Help students see it as a tool for understanding, not as a political slogan. Handle respectfully of students from varied backgrounds who may relate to these issues differently.
Intersectionality is about ranking who has it worst — adding up identities to decide who deserves most sympathy.
This is a common misunderstanding, and neither Crenshaw nor most serious thinkers about intersectionality intended it this way. Intersectionality is an analytical tool — a way of seeing how identities combine to shape experience. It is not a ranking system. It does not tell us that a person with more marginalised identities is worse off than a person with fewer. Wealthy people with minority identities often have substantial advantages; poor people in majority groups often face real hardship. The point of intersectionality is to understand specific experiences accurately — not to compete over who has it worst. When used well, the concept makes our thinking more nuanced. When misused as a ranking system, it becomes crude and unhelpful.
Only people with specific identities can talk about issues affecting those identities.
This is a misuse of intersectional thinking, not part of the original concept. Crenshaw and most serious thinkers have never claimed that only specific people can discuss specific issues. People can and should learn about experiences different from their own. They can support causes that do not directly affect them. They can hold informed views on issues they have not personally experienced. The real insight of intersectionality is that people with specific combinations of identities have valuable perspectives often missed by broader discussions — so we should listen carefully to them. This is different from saying others cannot speak at all. Making intersectionality into 'stay in your lane' rules would undermine the solidarity and broader coalitions that social change usually requires.
Focusing on identity differences prevents us from seeing what all people share.
This concern has some legitimate basis but is often overstated. Noticing identity differences does not prevent noticing shared humanity or shared interests. In fact, the two work together. We can recognise that a Black woman and a white woman share interests as women while also recognising that their experiences of being women differ. We can recognise that poor people of different races share class interests while noticing that race shapes specific experiences within shared class. The either-or framing — either shared humanity or identity differences — misses that good thinking holds both. Most thoughtful movements for change (civil rights, labour movements, women's rights) have combined shared solidarity with attention to specific experiences of people within the movement. Doing one does not require ignoring the other.
Intersectionality has become one of the most influential concepts in social science, legal studies, and activism over the past three decades. Teaching it at secondary level requires engaging with its origins, applications, and the genuine debates it generates.
Kimberlé Crenshaw, a legal scholar at UCLA and Columbia, introduced the term in her 1989 article 'Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine'. The specific context was US anti-discrimination law. In cases like DeGraffenreid v. General Motors (1976), US courts had ruled that Black women could claim discrimination as women or as Black people, but not as Black women specifically. The courts could not see the combined discrimination — GM had hired Black men (so not racism in the court's view) and white women (so not sexism), while excluding Black women. Crenshaw's article identified this as a structural failure of the legal system. She used 'intersectionality' to describe how discrimination could combine at the intersection of identities. The 1989 article focused on law; her 1991 article 'Mapping the Margins' extended the analysis to violence against women of colour.
While Crenshaw coined the term, she built on a longer tradition. Black feminist thought had long noted the specific situation of Black women. The Combahee River Collective Statement (1977) declared: 'We are actively committed to struggling against racial, sexual, heterosexual, and class oppression, and see as our particular task the development of integrated analysis.' Audre Lorde, bell hooks, Patricia Hill Collins, Angela Davis, and others developed related analyses. Crenshaw named and systematised a framework that others had been developing.
Since 1989, intersectionality has expanded substantially.
Disability intersecting with gender, race, and class; sexuality with race and religion; immigration status with other identities; age with gender; and many others. It has moved from US Black feminist thought to global applications. Patricia Hill Collins and Sirma Bilge's 'Intersectionality' (2016) is a major academic overview.
Legally. US courts have partially adopted intersectional analysis in some discrimination cases. Other jurisdictions (Canada, EU, various UN bodies) have adopted aspects. International human rights bodies increasingly use intersectional frameworks.
Public health, education, and social policy have adopted intersectional analysis to design programmes that address combined disadvantage. Critics argue this is sometimes bureaucratic tokenism; defenders point to specific improvements.
Feminist movements have increasingly engaged intersectional critique — acknowledging that earlier 'mainstream' feminism often centred white, middle-class women while marginalising others. Racial justice movements have similarly engaged critique about gender. Disability rights movements have worked to include people of colour and women. LGBTQ movements have engaged race and class.
Intersectionality has become a major research paradigm across social sciences, with thousands of studies applying the framework.
Intersectionality originated in US Black feminist thought but has been applied globally. Dalit feminism in India has examined caste intersecting with gender and class. Indigenous feminism in Latin America and elsewhere has examined colonisation intersecting with gender. Postcolonial feminism has critiqued how Western feminism has sometimes missed Global South women's specific experiences. African feminist scholars have applied intersectional analysis to particular African contexts. These are not derivative of the US origin; they are parallel developments engaging similar concerns. Some scholars argue the US origin of the term makes it inadequate for global analysis; others argue the underlying insight is genuinely transportable.
Several genuine critiques exist. Scope — has intersectionality become so broad it loses meaning? Some argue applying it everywhere dilutes the specific analytical insight about discrimination. Class — has it centred identity over material conditions? Some class-focused analysts argue intersectionality can obscure shared working-class interests. Application — does focus on multiple identities fragment coalitions? Some argue identity proliferation makes broader solidarity harder. Misuse — has it become a rhetorical weapon rather than analytical tool? Some point to usage that shuts down discussion rather than advancing understanding. Institutional absorption — has it been adopted by corporations and institutions in ways that neutralise its radical edge? Some argue 'intersectionality' has been made corporate-friendly in ways that prevent structural challenge. Conservative critique — some conservatives argue it divides people along identity lines that are less important than shared citizenship or values. Liberal critique — some liberals worry about its use to enforce orthodoxy rather than open inquiry. These critiques are not equally strong, but they are worth engaging.
Treating it as ranking (who is 'more oppressed'). Using it to claim only specific people can speak. Applying it to every situation regardless of whether it illuminates. Using it as shorthand for political orthodoxy rather than analytical tool. These are real misuses that have damaged the concept's reception.
Crenshaw has been clear in more recent interviews that intersectionality is an analytical tool, not an ideology. She has critiqued both right-wing attacks on the concept and left-wing applications she sees as distorting it. Her position is careful — defending the core insight while acknowledging that misuses have occurred. Beyond identity — intersecting systems. Some scholars have expanded intersectionality to examine intersecting systems of power (patriarchy, white supremacy, capitalism, colonialism) rather than only intersecting identities. This framing focuses on structural analysis rather than individual experience. Patricia Hill Collins's 'matrix of domination' is a foundational concept here.
Intersectionality is politically contested. Some students will have encountered it only as political rhetoric (for or against). Present it seriously as an analytical tool with genuine origins, legitimate uses, legitimate critiques, and misuses. Help students develop the capacity to use it thoughtfully rather than either embracing or rejecting it based on political position. Good engagement with the concept is itself a civic skill.
Intersectionality means that only people with particular combinations of identities can speak on particular issues.
This is a common misuse but not what Crenshaw proposed or what most serious scholars mean by intersectionality. The concept is an analytical tool — a way of seeing how identities combine to shape experience — not a rule about who can speak. People can and should learn about experiences different from their own, advocate for causes that do not directly affect them, and engage in cross-identity solidarity. The real insight of intersectionality is that people with specific combinations of identities often have perspectives that broader discussions miss, so listening carefully to them matters. This is different from claiming that others cannot speak at all. Crenshaw has explicitly rejected this misuse. 'Stay in your lane' rules would undermine the solidarity and coalition-building that social change typically requires. They also misread the concept's purpose. Using intersectional thinking well means taking specific perspectives seriously while maintaining open discussion — not closing it down.
Intersectionality is a recent postmodern invention with no serious intellectual pedigree.
The intellectual roots of intersectionality are substantial and long. Black women scholars and activists had been articulating related ideas long before Crenshaw named the concept — Anna Julia Cooper in the late 19th century, Sojourner Truth's 'Ain't I A Woman' speech (1851), the work of Ida B. Wells, and many others. The Combahee River Collective Statement (1977) was a major articulation of intersectional thinking before the term was coined. Angela Davis's 'Women, Race and Class' (1981), bell hooks's 'Ain't I a Woman: Black Women and Feminism' (1981), and Audre Lorde's writings from the late 1970s onwards all developed related analyses. Crenshaw named and systematised a tradition of thought that had been developing for decades, even generations. Dismissing intersectionality as 'recent' or 'postmodern' misreads its intellectual history. The concept emerged from legal scholarship and Black feminist thought, with careful argumentation. Engaging with its actual origins, rather than caricatures, produces better understanding than political dismissal.
Intersectionality divides people and prevents solidarity across groups.
This concern has some legitimate basis but is often overstated. Recognising that identities combine to shape experience does not prevent building solidarity — it enables more honest solidarity. Women's movements that attend to race, class, disability, and sexuality produce broader coalitions than movements that center a single type of woman's experience. Labour movements that engage race and gender build stronger working-class solidarity than movements that dismiss these differences. Civil rights movements that engage gender and class achieve more than movements that do not. The historical record suggests that movements combining shared cause with attention to differences have typically built more durable coalitions than those ignoring differences. What does prevent solidarity is treating any single identity as the only relevant category or treating differences as barriers rather than as experiences to understand. Intersectional analysis done well opens space for solidarity rather than closing it.
Intersectionality encourages identity politics over universal principles.
This framing treats identity-based analysis and universal principles as opposites, when they are often complementary. Universal principles (equal dignity, human rights, democratic participation) provide the moral ground on which specific analysis operates. Intersectional analysis asks how universal principles are or are not being realised for specific people whose situations have been missed. This is not abandoning universal principles — it is checking whether they are being applied universally. A universal principle that fails to protect Black women while protecting Black men and white women is not actually being applied universally. Intersectional analysis reveals this failure and pushes toward genuine universality. The apparent conflict between identity-focused analysis and universal principles typically dissolves when universal principles are taken seriously. The critique of intersectionality as 'identity politics' sometimes masks resistance to including specific groups whose situations have been ignored. Engaging with universal principles in intersectional depth is more rigorous than asserting them abstractly.
Key texts for students: Kimberlé Crenshaw, 'Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics' (University of Chicago Legal Forum, 1989). Crenshaw, 'Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color' (Stanford Law Review, 1991). Patricia Hill Collins, 'Black Feminist Thought' (1990, updated 2000). Collins and Sirma Bilge, 'Intersectionality' (2016) — major accessible academic overview. Audre Lorde, 'Sister Outsider' (1984). bell hooks, 'Ain't I a Woman' (1981), 'Feminist Theory: From Margin to Center' (1984). Angela Davis, 'Women, Race and Class' (1981). The Combahee River Collective Statement (1977). For contemporary applications: Roxane Gay, 'Bad Feminist' (2014). Mikki Kendall, 'Hood Feminism' (2020). Kimberlé Crenshaw's TED talk 'The Urgency of Intersectionality' (2016). For debates and critiques: Adolph Reed Jr.'s writings, particularly on class versus identity in progressive politics. Judith Butler's various writings engaging with identity and performativity. Chandra Mohanty, 'Feminism Without Borders' (2003) — postcolonial feminist engagement. For global applications: Sharmila Rege on Dalit feminism; Uma Narayan's work; African feminist scholars including Sylvia Tamale, Amina Mama, and others. For specific domains: K. Crenshaw et al., 'Critical Race Theory' (1995 anthology). Devon Carbado, 'Colorblind Intersectionality' (2013). Organisations: African American Policy Forum (founded by Crenshaw); Center for Intersectional Justice; various academic intersectional research centres. For critique: John McWhorter, Coleman Hughes, Glenn Loury on various aspects. For centrist engagement: various pieces in Atlantic, New York Times, Harper's engaging with both successes and problems. Academic journals: Signs; Gender & Society; Feminist Theory; Critical Sociology; various law reviews carrying ongoing intersectional legal work.
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