Separation of Powers

Any drawing showing shared work — a kitchen, a classroom, a sports team, a family. The completion should name at least two different people with different jobs. For example: 'In my picture, my mum does the cooking, and my dad does the shopping.' This shows the child understands that big tasks are shared.

Sharing jobs is a good idea because everyone can help and nothing is missed. One person doing everything is not a good idea because they will be too tired, and they will make mistakes that nobody else can fix.

The separation of powers is the idea that government should be divided into different parts so that no one person or group has too much control. The three main parts are the legislature, which makes laws; the executive, which runs the country; and the judiciary, which decides cases in court. This separation matters because it stops any single leader from using all the power to harm people. For example, if the same person made the laws and also judged court cases, they could pass unfair laws and then send anyone who disagreed to prison. Separating powers means each part can check the others and protect the freedom of ordinary people.

An independent court system is the part that can stop the executive and the legislature from doing things that break the law or the constitution. If courts are not independent — if the president can fire judges, or if judges are paid to agree with the government — then they cannot do their job. Powerful people know this: when authoritarian leaders want to take more control, they often attack the courts first. An independent court means that even a president or a ruling party must obey the law. Without it, the rest of the separation of powers collapses, because no one can enforce the limits on the other branches. This is why protecting the courts is one of the most important jobs of a free country.

The claim that the separation of powers is outdated rests on an important observation: modern government is vastly more complex than the systems Montesquieu described in 1748. Today's states manage enormous economies, regulate advanced technology, respond to global crises, and operate through huge bureaucracies that did not exist in the eighteenth century. It is worth asking whether a doctrine designed for a much smaller and simpler state can still do the work required of it. A serious answer should accept the challenge while defending the core principle, because the underlying logic of the separation of powers remains as important as ever.

The case for the 'outdated' claim has real force. Executive power has expanded enormously in every modern democracy. Regulatory agencies — from environmental protection agencies to central banks — make rules that have the effect of law, often without direct legislative approval. Emergency powers, used during the COVID-19 pandemic and after security incidents, gave executives sweeping authority with limited oversight. International organisations, trade agreements, and global financial flows mean that many important decisions are made outside national constitutional structures entirely. Montesquieu's three branches do not easily map onto this landscape.

Furthermore, party politics has reshaped how the branches interact. In parliamentary systems, the executive is typically drawn from the majority in the legislature — meaning that the formal separation is often thin in practice. In presidential systems, unified party control of multiple branches (as happens regularly in the US and elsewhere) can mean that separation becomes nominal. The branches share institutional forms but not, always, meaningful independence.

However, the conclusion that the doctrine is 'outdated' overstates the case. The underlying principle — that power needs to be divided and checked to prevent abuse — has not been falsified by complexity. It has been confirmed. The cases of democratic decline over the past fifteen years, from Hungary to Turkey, have all involved the erosion of separation: the capture of courts, the weakening of independent agencies, and the concentration of power in a dominant executive. These cases show not that the separation of powers is unnecessary but that it is essential — and that its erosion has predictable and serious consequences.

Modern democracies have also developed new institutions that extend rather than replace the original doctrine. Independent central banks, electoral commissions, human rights commissions, data protection authorities, and public broadcasters function as a form of 'fourth branch' — providing oversight that the traditional branches cannot easily supply. Judicial review, constitutional courts, and international human rights courts have developed into powerful checks on both legislative and executive action. These institutions are developments of the separation of powers, not departures from it.

The strongest response is that the separation of powers needs updating, not abandonment. The eighteenth-century model — three clean, equal branches — never fully captured how real governments work. But the principle behind it, that concentrated power is dangerous and must be checked through institutional counterweights, is as relevant as ever. What modern democracies need is not less separation but more sophisticated forms of it — including independent agencies, meaningful legislative oversight, robust judicial review, and international accountability mechanisms.

In conclusion, the claim that the separation of powers is outdated mistakes the outdated details for an outdated principle. The specific institutions of 1748 do not fully match modern government. The underlying logic — that power needs to be divided, checked, and held accountable — has been strengthened by every instance of its erosion. The doctrine needs continual renewal, not replacement.

In presidential systems, the executive and legislature are elected separately and have independent mandates. The president cannot be removed by the legislature except through impeachment for serious wrongdoing, and the president cannot dissolve the legislature. This produces the strongest formal separation of powers. The US, Brazil, Mexico, and most Latin American countries follow this model.

In parliamentary systems, the executive is drawn from the legislature — the prime minister is typically the leader of the largest party or coalition. The executive depends on the continued confidence of parliament and can be removed by a confidence vote. The formal separation of powers is therefore weaker, because the executive and legislative branches are fused at the top. The UK, Germany, Japan, and most European democracies use this model.

Which is more effective at preventing the concentration of power is genuinely contested. Presidential systems have stronger formal separation, but they have also produced most of the democratic collapses of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries — particularly in Latin America. When a president is determined to concentrate power, the formal separation can prove weak, especially if the ruling party dominates the legislature. The fixed term can also produce gridlock, which tempts presidents toward extra-constitutional action.

Parliamentary systems rely on weaker formal separation but on stronger informal mechanisms — parliamentary scrutiny, strong opposition parties, independent media, and the ability to remove a failing government. Their track record in defending democracy has arguably been better, particularly in established European democracies.

On balance, parliamentary systems appear more effective in practice, but this likely depends more on political culture, civil society, and institutional depth than on the formal structure itself. The separation of powers works less through formal rules than through the habits and norms that make those rules enforceable.